Cheney is a Criminal
This point was made two years ago during the Valerie Plame affair, when Cheney was complicit in leaking her identity as a CIA agent to the press. Now here is another reason to throw him in jail: when a National Archives unit criticized Cheney for resisting their oversight, he suggested abolishing it. Cheney’s legal advisor, David S. Addington, argues that Cheney is exempt from oversight of the executive branch because he is also part of the legislative branch.
Mr. Addington did not reply in writing to Mr. Leonard’s letters, according to officials familiar with their exchanges. But Mr. Addington stated in conversations that the vice president’s office was not an “entity within the executive branch” because, under the Constitution, the vice president also plays a role in the legislative branch, as president of the Senate, able to cast a vote in the event of a tie.
Mr. Waxman rejected that argument. “He doesn’t have classified information because of his legislative function,” Mr. Waxman said of Mr. Cheney. “It’s because of his executive function.”
Cheney’s office is attempting to destroy the balance of power and checks & balances, which have been principles necessary for the U.S. government to serve its ideals of freedom and democracy. Cheney is trying to extend the power of the executive branch over the functions of the legislative, thereby making the U.S. more like a monarchy and aristocracy than a democracy. As John Locke would say, the executive has misused the powers that the public entrusted in him, and thus we are justified in revolt against him.
June 22nd, 2007 21:00
No shit. I don’t get it, how is it that the administration thinks they can just ignore laws? And why is that no one is trying to stop us?
June 23rd, 2007 10:52
I agree. Cheney should be prosecuted for his transgressions. but I think it’s important to note that curing recent executive abuses will not necessarily solve separation of powers problems that plague our federal government. One problem with the welfare state, as constituted by the new deal, is most of the oversight is by the executive. administrative agencies issue regulations based on general laws that delegate authority to them. and administrative courts adjudicate controversies created by regulations issued. as a practical matter, this means that a lot of the lawmaking and law adjudicating function has been subsumed by the executive. while legislators and courts still maintain ultimate veto power, for a host of reasons they are wary to invoke this power (see the recent greenhouse gas problem). so we’re left with a government that is 90% executive, 10% co-equal branches. and this shift to a unitary executive has been slowly happening over the past few decades. No president, regardless of ideological bent, has any incentive to change the current order because it would shrink their power over domestic and foreign affairs.
It’s not that this is a horrible system. There are some efficiencies gained as administrative bodies can act and adjudicate a lot quicker that congress and federal courts. but the cost is that the executive has almost complete power over major domestic areas like education, national security, voting rights, environment, tax, immigration, and telecommunications to name a few. A long term solution needs to figure out how to curb executive abuse but also how to create a system that helps practically facilitate real checks and balances and separation of powers without eliminating the welfare state.
June 23rd, 2007 11:06
Very interesting comment. I have a few questions. First, you refer to the “welfare state” as if that is an appropriate description of our current American governance system. Although some programs of the welfare state still exist, haven’t many of its programs been gradually dismantled through neoliberal privatization over the past few decades? And hasn’t the rise in the executive’s power, especially with Reagan, been associated with the decline of the welfare state? Second, what is it about the welfare state that you think should be retained? Third, why do you assume that the executive oversight of the initial, new deal defined “welfare state” will still be conducive to the programs of the welfare state today? Fourth, I don’t agree with your statement, “No president, regardless of ideological bent, has any incentive to change the current order because it would shrink their power over domestic and foreign affairs.” If a president’s ideology includes a reduced role for the executive and a greater role for the legislative, then they would obviously have an incentive to change the current order. Why do you assume that a president must have a selfish motive of self-aggrandisement? Maybe you’re right. If so, then that would be a good argument to get rid of the institution of the executive and its residues of monarchical sovereignty. Sovereignty and capitalism are mutually supportive, so let’s get rid of them both!
June 23rd, 2007 12:10
Well, I was strictly addressing the rise in executive power and didn’t mean to imply any connection between the move towards a unitary executive and the reduction of the welfare state. a unitary executive says nothing about the substantive law or policy. it’s just about the allocation of lawmaking and adjudicative power. so we can have a democratically elected unitary executive that’s very progressive and we can have a decentralized government that’s very conservative. of course, institutional commitments can engender a certain kind of politics and obviously don’t create a blank slate. but there is typically enough flexibility for a broad range of policies (which explains why so many many open liberal democracies are constituted differently, but still manage to have similar policy).
Privatization has certainly reduced the welfare state. no question. but the institutional structure is still there for a president to come in an unilaterally change that. In the utilities context, I’m less certain how things work. but the EPA certainly has the authority to regulate private industry a lot more than they’re doing. Similarly, the FCC has the authority to reign in some of the excesses of the telecommunications industry.
and it’s not that all presidents are innately self-absorbed. it’s that if you are really committed to substantively changing the existing order and you get into power and realize that it will be a lot easier to do the things you want to do without making massive institutional changes (that you might agree with in the abstract), you will probably not actively seek to reorder the balance of power.
what I meant about a reduction of the welfare state is that the most obvious attempts to reorder the balance of power would be to eliminate administrative agencies. but this would necessarily shrink the welfare state. there are solutions that wouldn’t require shrinking government, but might increase separation of powers or at least make a unitary executive more democratic. for example, we could vote for the heads of administrative bodies (like the IRS and EEOC) and prosecutorial bodies and not let the president appoint people to heads these agencies. or we could move stuff to other branches. in the immigration context, people have suggested making immigration courts Article I courts as opposed to Article II courts.